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Where do preferences come from? What determines their properties? Though traditionally reluctant to ask such questions, economists have recently turned to evolutionary models for answers.
We focus on intertemporal preferences here, arising out of the evolutionary implications of different reproductive strategies or life histories. An agent's life history specifies the agent's number and timing (and, in a richer model, quality) of offspring. Evolution will select the life history that maximizes the growth rate of the associated group of individuals. We begin with the simplest possible biological life history-that of a semelparous agent that, if it survives a fixed number of years, reproduces and then dies. We show the evolutionary criterion for success in this case entails hyperbolic time discounting of the log of the number of offspring produced. However, the rate of time preference is a function of age, not of time relative to the present, and hence there are no preference reversals in the sense of behavioral economics. At the same time, the optimal strategy maximizes the exponentially discounted number of offspring, provided we discount at the sum of the death rate and the maximal growth rate. Conventional discounting thus suffices to induce optimal choices from the agent.
More generally, if the animal is iteroparous, and so may have a non-degenerate profile of offspring, we show the evolutionary indifference curves over offspring of various ages are hyperplanes that are not parallel, but tilt to reflect greater impatience as the growth rate increases. There is no additively separable function of the age profile of expected offspring that is globally equivalent to this basic biological growth-rate criterion, even if arbitrary age dependence is allowed. Further, the rate of time discounting of offspring falls with age, if there is a positive discounting to begin with. Evolution's preferences thus exhibit a present bias, though this still cannot imply preference reversals. Again, the optimal strategy maximizes the appropriately exponentially discounted number of offspring.
Semelparous Life Histories
We begin with the simplest case, that of a semelparous life history, in which an organism reproduces at a fixed, single age (if it survives that long) and then dies.
Let time be discrete, given by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. An agent is characterized by a pair (x, τ ) identifying the agent's expected number of offspring x, to be produced at age τ , conditional on the agent's surviving until age τ .
In keeping with our focus on preferences over reproduction, we represent the strategy (x, τ ) simply as a number of offspring and a time, though it presumably reflects a collection of activities, such as where to forage, what food so eat, when to mate, and so on, that determine reproduction. The strategy (x, τ ) is heritable, so that offspring are characterized by the same strategy as their parents. We are interested in which such strategy will be favored by evolution.
While waiting to reproduce, the agent faces an instantaneous death risk of δ > 0. An agent choosing (x, τ ) thus survives for τ periods with probability e −δτ . If and only if the agent survives, the x offspring appear, at which point the agent dies. We work with a continuum of agents and without aggregate uncertainty. 
In this τ × τ matrix, each row n ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1} applies to the agents who enter period t at age n. The single term e −δ that appears in row n identifies the proportion of these agents who survive until the beginning of the next period, at which point they are one period older.
The final row corresponds to agents who enter at age τ . These agents have x offspring each, with a fraction e −δ of these offspring surviving to become next period's 1-period-olds and with the parents disappearing from the population. This is referred to as a Leslie matrix (Brian Charlesworth (1994) ).
Asymptotically, the growth factorλ for this population is the unique positive real root of the characteristic equation of the Leslie matrix. We now consider a population of agents characterized by a variety of life histories (x, τ ). Evolution will select for the value (x, τ ) that maximizes e
Hence, evolution evaluates births according to the function ln(·) and discounts them hyperbolicallyevolution exhibits a present bias. The equilibrium population will grow geometrically at ratẽ λ, or (equivalently) exponentially at the growth rate r = lnλ.
Evolution can induce agents to behave optimally via conventional exponential discounting. Let (x 1 , τ 1 ) be the optimal life history, giving rise to exponential growth at rate x. This choice of discount rates is intuitive. There are two costs of delaying reproduction. One of these is simply that death occurs at rate δ. The other is that a given number of offspring will comprise a smaller fraction of a population growing at rate r 1 . The sum of these two rates is the rate at which delaying births causes an agent to fall behind the population. The comparison between two reproductive strategies is then given by (using
Exponential discounting, at the sum of the death and optimal growth rates, thus identifies the optimal strategy (x, τ ). More rapid population growth induces a higher discount rate. (See Ingemar Hansson and Charles Stuart (1990) and Alan R. Rogers (1994) for similar results.)
A population that shrinks rapidly enough will induce negative discounting, in which case reproduction is better deferred. If the population growth rate is zero, agents will discount at the death rate δ. This will be the case if Malthusian considerations constrain the set of feasible (x, τ ) values to those featuring nonpositive growth.
Iteroparous Life Histories
We now generalize the analysis to iteroparous life histories, in which an individual may have offspring at more than one age.
Asymptotic Growth Rate
Suppose that agents live for periods, producing x i offspring in each period i = 1, . . . , . A life history is then a collection (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ), where some of these entries may be zero. The
Leslie matrix is
The population's asymptotic growth factor is again the largest real rootλ of the characteristic equation of this matrix. This equation can be written as
. 
No Time Separable Representation
The basic biological criterion for the population growth rate is a complex function of the fertility profile. Let e δ λ = θ(x 1 , x 2 , ...) be the function implicitly defined by (1). Then the marginal rate of substitution between x t and x t+1 is θ itself, which is a strictly increasing function of each x s for s = t, t + 1. It is then immediate that there then can be no additively separable representation of preferences, even if an arbitrary age dependence is permitted.
Induced Preferences Over Consumption
Economists are typically interested in preferences over consumption rather than births. The simplest transition from preferences over births to preferences over consumption is made by assuming that births are a function of consumption, where preferences over consumption are those induced by the underlying preferences over births.
Consider for simplicity the case in which age-τ births depend only on age-τ consumption.
Let f τ (c τ ) give age-τ births as a function of period-τ consumption c τ . Suppose that all the f τ are strictly increasing and concave.
For any consumption vector c, an indifference curve is defined by (from (1), replacing
where θ > 0 is constant on a particular indifference surface. A higher value of θ indicates a higher indifference curve, so that consumption plan (c 1 , . . . , c ) is preferred to (c 1 , . . . , c ) if
It follows readily that evolution's indifference surfaces over consumption bundles (c 1 , . . . , c ) have the usual shape, in the sense that evolution's preferences can be described by a utility function θ(c 1 , ..., c ) that is strictly increasing and quasi-concave.
Present Bias
As long as the evolution has a preference for early births, evolution's criterion generates a decreasing rate of impatience with age. We illustrate this by considering a type that lives to age three with fertility/utility f 1 , f 2 and f 3 in periods 1, 2 and 3. Consider the possibilities of augmenting fertility/utility by η 1 in the first period and augmenting it by η 2 in the second period. Suppose there is indifference between these alternatives, so that, for some θ > 1 (cf.
(2)),
and hence θη 1 = η 2 . Now consider the possibilities of augmenting fertility/utility by η 1 in the second period and augmenting it by η 2 in the third. Let the first option lie on an indifference surface characterized by θ , so that
As long as η 1 > 0, we have θ < θ (i.e., a pure postponement of births is disadvantageous when the population is growing). Hence, we have θ η 1 < η 2 , implying
Evolution is thus indifferent when deferring the increment in fertility/utility from age 1 to 2, but strictly prefers to defer from period 2 to 3, i.e., evolution's preferences exhibit a present bias. In essence, deferring increments in fertility/utility lowers the associated growth rate, leading to less impatience.
Evolution's present bias does not lead to preference reversals here, in contrast to the models of present bias that form the heart of behavioral economics. Preferences are defined over age, rather than over time relative to the present. Suppose, for example, that
Discussion
The evolutionary criterion for maximizing a population's growth rate entails a present bias. If we are interested in which of a collection of possible life histories will dominate a population or why one mutant is likely to be more successful than another, then we must take this present bias into account. At the same time, once we have identified the optimal life history and the attendant growth rate, the behavior induced by this life history can be described by exponential discounting at the sum of that growth rate and the death rate.
Peter Sozou (1998) and Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin (2005) show that if future consumption may disappear before it can be realized, and if this possibility is not explicitly recognized by the agent, then it may be evolutionarily advantageous to compensate with a present bias in the agent's discounting. More generally, if evolution embeds aspects of the feasible set into our preferences, there is little reason to expect consistent discounting.
We have implicitly maintained throughout the standard assumption that risks are independent across agents. Our continuing research explores the implications of environmental fluctuations that induce correlated risks. 
